I thought you might be interested to read the notes from a meeting I had a couple of weeks ago when I was in Khost province (bordering Pakistan), with a reconciled former Taliban commander (and cousin of one of the most important Taliban commanders operating just across the border in Pakistan today, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA). He is a Mullah (a religious leader) in Khost province, and belongs to one of the most fiesty tribes in Southeastern Afghanistan.
I conducted this interview in the context of a paper I am writing, to obtain perspectives on the topic in question from as many different groups as possible including members from the Soviet-Backed Afghan regime in the 1980s, and former jihadis, many of whom joined ranks with the Taliban in the 1990s.
I was slightly nervous about meeting this very impressive looking man (who I will call Malauwi Faizullah, although that isn’t his real name). I’d seen him the day before at another gathering, and had requested (through a colleague) to meet him at our office.
Malauwi Faizullah swept into our compound the following morning wearing a large white turban and a long flowing white shalwar kameez and beige waistcoat (traditional wear for men across the country). He had a neatly trimmed large black beard, dark skin and beautiful dark brown eyes.
We sat in one of the rooms in our little field office, steaming cups of green tea on a glass coffee table before us; the room was quiet except for the chirping of birds outside the office window. April is a beautiful month in Khost, the land is alive and fresh.
What follow are some disjointed excerpts from our meeting (and forgive me, but I will blank out certain names / issues), in which Malauwi Faizullah spoke to me openly. This will give you a small glimpse of how fragmented Afghan society is, nothing is black and white. Yet neither does this interview give a full or objective account either. They are comments from one man, struggling to understand where his future lies at a particular time in his country's struggle to break free of this mess.
In parts, his comments are deeply sad, and reveal how vulnerable he is, despite his connections; yet this is the story of so many Afghans.
“The government is like a tree. It wields fruits. The people are like its fruits. But any government that has no roots in the community is going to dry.
The government has no roots in the community because 95% of the population has a jihadi background. They were fighting for 15-20 years, yet there is no share for the ex-jihadis in this government, even though most of the people in this society are ex-jihadis.
During the Taliban regime, people from the more remote rural areas favoured the Taliban. They had strong Islamic views. The Taliban brought ex-jihadis into their regime. But this government is only made up of Leftists.
There were many mistakes during the Taliban time but there were no uprisings against the Mullahs. What I mean by this is that in Afghan culture, people do not oppose these elements of society, such as Islam, Sharia or Mullahs.
Unfortunately the Afghan Government and the International Community don’t understand Afghan culture or society. If a Mullah says a few verses of the Koran and recites some Hadiths, people respect him. But no one is going to respect an engineer or a doctor who is reciting Hadiths. The government is using these engineers and doctors to lead our society, but they should use Mullahs.
These are the 3 elements fundamental to a functioning Government: military power, political power and the ability to use propaganda effectively.
The government has the first two, but not the third. Only the Ulema (religious scholars) can effectively use propaganda. The government needs to realise this and use them. They need to reach out to the people in Mosques, and students in madrassas. These are the people who can motivate our society.
The International Community doesn’t pay attention to these elements. They don’t understand.
After the intervention of the Coalition Forces in 2001, and the subsequent re-emergence of former Khalqis (faction of the former Communist regime) in positions throughout the security forces, did security improve at all? Was there a general perception among former jihadis that they were being targeted in search / military operations?
MF: 95 % of the population is former jihadi. During the Taliban regime, the jihadis had a lot of power. However when Karzai came to power, the former Leftists re-emerged and were appointed in many government posts. Yes, they target former jihadis, they provide a lot of incorrect information to the Coalition Forces.
[…]
In over 100 government gatherings or inauguration ceremonies that I have attended since I was reconciled and allowed back into the country, I have received threats from the insurgents that I will be kidnapped or killed.
I am under a lot of pressure. This morning, a person came to my house and informed me that there are 2 people on motorbikes who follow me everywhere I go. If I leave the city, they will kill me. I have security guards in my house. Sometimes I feel I should leave this country.
Recently, two of my security guards were killed. They had received so many threats and one day they were killed.
I think there is a common misperception among the International Community and the military that people have a choice about whether to support the insurgents or whether to support the government; and that providing development or other forms of assistance will sway them in favour of the government – but I’m not sure people actually have that choice, certainly not anymore.
MF: Absolutely. Absolutely.
The reconciliation process is very important. The Taliban contacted us about this. They are keen to get this process underway, as they are starting to feel the pressure in Pakistan. If this process started, that would be a good thing.
We don’t trust this government though, they haven’t fulfilled their promises. So what do we say to the Taliban when they ask about reconciliation? We don’t have an answer for them.
I believe that people from the Southeast region can play a very important role in this reconciliation process. If we look at the insurgents, most of them are from this region.
I have requested a committee, which would be composed of Ulema and ex-jihadis. [...]
The brother of […]. was apprehended by the […] and sent to […]. When he was released, he went back to Pakistan. I sent people to him to ask about reconciliation, and what he thought about it. He said he was in favour. But he was arrested [….] and is scared to come back. He asked me, “if you are convinced by this present government, if you think we will not be arrested if we come back, then yes this reconciliation is a good idea.” We can easily do this reconciliation.
The Ulema need to be brought into government posts. […]
A number of elders and Ulema have contacts with the Taliban. What the insurgents want to be assured of is that they will not be arrested if they come in for reconciliation. They will keep their distance until they can be sure they will be guaranteed immunity.
In the meantime, the Taliban will continue to demonstrate that this government is illegitimate.”
[The meeting continues for a while, then I tell him to take care, in light of the threats against him.]
“Our lives and deaths are not in our own hands”.
We say goodbye. He extends his hand to shake mine (which is in fact extremely uncharacteristic of a Mullah to do this to a woman), and gives me the warmest smile when I use the only phrase in Pashtu that I know and tell him he is welcome anytime.
